Causality
| Category | Philosophy |
|---|---|
| Depth | Standard |
| Article type | local Catholic reference article |
Definition
Causality is the dependence of something on what helps account for its being, its change or its activity. Asking for a cause asks a “why” question. In classical philosophy, that question can concern what a thing is made from, what makes it this kind of thing, what produces it, or what its activity is directed towards.
Catholic usage
A wooden table illustrates four questions. The timber provides material; the arrangement makes it a table; the carpenter produces it; supporting objects is its intended use. These answers can all be true together because they explain different aspects of one result. The example is clearest for an artefact; its application to natural substances requires further care.
This wider vocabulary prevents a common misunderstanding in theology. Calling God a cause need not mean placing an invisible push between two measurable physical events. The Thomistic claim concerns the dependence of things and their powers on a first source, including when ordinary natural causes operate.
Doctrinal context
Causation is not established merely because one event follows another. A bell may ring just before rain without producing it. To identify a cause, we examine the relevant connection: the agent's power, the conditions, the process and competing explanations. A philosophical account should welcome such investigation.
Nor does every explanation have the same form. A mathematical reason for a theorem is not a carpenter producing a chair. Aristotle's four causes distinguish kinds of explanation; they do not turn every use of “because” into a physical impact.
In arguments for God, the causal principle must be stated accurately. “Everything has a cause” would include God and fail to state Aquinas's position. The argument concerns things whose actuality or existence is dependent. A critic may challenge that dependence or the inference to its source. An uncaused source is the proposed conclusion of the argument; merely exempting a favoured object would not establish it.
Distinctions and safeguards
Primary and secondary causes are not necessarily rival explanations. A creature can act through its own powers while depending on God for its existence and action. This claim is distinct from occasionalism, which denies genuine causal efficacy to creatures. It also differs from treating every natural event as an unexplained miracle.
Do probabilistic events disprove causality?
A cause need not be defined as a condition from which we can predict one unique outcome. Probabilistic laws and causal powers raise further questions about what a process explains. One should neither claim that quantum theory settles every metaphysical issue nor force a deterministic model onto all causation. The particular causal premise must be defended in the form actually used.